The True Source of Judicial Review

I'm doing some reading for my comparative constitutional law class, in particular about judicial review itself. We read Marbury, obviously, but also a case by the Israeli Supreme Court in the '90s that established judicial review as more or less a fundamental principle of constitutional democracy. That's a sentiment with which I more or less agree. The casebook then discusses various controversies surrounding judicial review, including the Alexander Bickel "countermajoritarian dilemma" saga from American politics but also the fact that in the aftermath of the Israeli Supreme Court's appropriation of the power of judicial review for itself it has faced assaults from the political branches. Specifically, we are told, there was a very recent effort by the Minister of Justice (a funny sort of title, given the following) to curtail the Court's power to invalidate laws that infringe upon human rights.
Now, admittedly, I don't think this effort succeeded, so it's important not to read too much into it. But still, I'd like to give an argument about what it means if the people decide to abolish or curtail judicial review on the grounds that it's anti-majoritarian. In his 1960 book The People and the Court, my grandfather argued that judicial review is simply the will of the people to limit themselves. Americans, we are told, are very fond of the fact that our government, while democratic, is also limited, and there are things that our democratic government, representing the will of the people, cannot do. The only way for this limitation to be real instead of existing solely on paper is for there to be an institution with the power to enforce those limitations, and it must be independent of the body that expresses the immediate will of the people: thus, judicial review. If the people truly wish to limit themselves, to place certain acts off limits no matter how much they might think they want them, then this desire is what will give power and legitimacy to the constitutional court's decrees. After all, it is still true that the U.S. Supreme Court possesses neither force nor will: it has the power neither to command military force nor to dole out monies for things it wishes done. Justice Breyer, in a recent book, compares the problem of giving effect to such a Court's orders to the question Hotspur poses to the wizard Owen Glendower in Henry IV, Part I. Glendower has made a boast that he can call spirits from the vasty deep, to which Hotspur replies:

Why, so can I, or so can any man; But will they come when you do call for them?

Justice Breyer argues that this is the problem a Court faces: it may decree the law to be such-and-such, but having no enforcement powers of its own how can it make the rest of the government obey it? In this country, the answer is that the people wish for the Constitution to have effect, and recognize that it is the Court which gives it the effect they desire. Accordingly, the people by and large will not tolerate elected officials who disregard the Court's verdicts, even when the people disagree with those verdicts. In America, for instance, enormous majorities, easily enough to enact some sort of overruling Amendment, disagree with the Citizens United decision. But imagine if President Obama decided that, because he thinks that ruling was wrong and most people think that ruling was wrong, he was simply going to ignore it, and continue to enforce those provisions of McCain-Feingold that were struck down. If he was lucky, he'd just not get re-elected; more likely he'd be impeached, and he would deserve it. We may disagree with the Court's rulings, but we all agree that even the Court's incorrect rulings are the law. And we want our public officials to follow the law, because we think it more important for the Constitution, our supreme desire to limit and channel our passions and desires, to be truly supreme than for the substantive actions of our government to be what we substantively desire in every instance. So we have no more Andrew Jacksons, who dare the Court to come and make him follow its orders; in fact, even Jackson repented in that particular instance when he saw that his position could lead to nullification.