The Supercommittee's Trigger

The idea behind the trigger mechanism backing the so-called supercommittee is that it will make cuts to things that both parties like, therefore forcing both parties to come together and reach a deal to avert those cuts. But it strikes me that's not quite correct. There are a fair number of Republicans at this point who have decided that cuts to defense spending are acceptable. It's certainly not anything like the highest priority on their list of policy goals. Likewise, there are a fair number of centrist-y Democrats who are fine with cutting domestic spending. So it strikes me that, rather than saying there are cuts to things Republicans like and cuts to things Democrats like, we should say that there are cuts to things Republicans don't like and cuts to things Democrats don't like. That changes the dynamic considerably: Republicans can now say, well, if we don't get a deal then at least we get domestic spending cuts, while Democrats can say, well, if we don't get a deal then at least we get defense spending cuts. That should make each party reluctant to support a deal that has too much stuff they don't like and not enough stuff they do like. So I'm thinking, trigger mechanism, here we come... (Barring, of course, the sensible deal in early 2013 to repeal the trigger's cuts.)