Amidst all of the discussion of the election of Bert Blyleven and Roberto Alomar to the Hall of Fame, both quite deserved, and Barry Larkin’s rise to the next-in-line, and Mark McGwire’s slow descent into Hall of Fame irrelevance, one big story is going and will go somewhat overlooked, for the same reason that it came to pass: John Franco got just 4.6% of the vote, and will be dropped from the ballot after only one time on it. This is a travesty. I will now make that case in depth and using statistical analysis.
I have compared John Franco to the five relief pitchers in the Hall of Fame already, plus two others who are certain to get in as soon as they hang up their spikes and two others who I think are at least deserving of being in the same category. In total: Hoyt Wilhelm, Rollie Fingers, Goose Gossage, Dennis Eckersly, Bruce Sutter, Lee Smith, Trevor Hoffman, Mariano Rivera, and Billy Wagner. These are, I think, the relief pitchers who have so far managed to justify their inclusion in the Hall of Fame discussion. The stats that I used to compare them are ERA, adjusted ERA, games, games finished, saves, WHIP, hits, home runs, walks, and strikeouts per nine innings pitched, strikeouts per walk, batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging percentage against, inherited runner scoring percentage, average leverage index, outs per game in relief, and save percentage, as well as seasons with over 20, over 30, and over 40 saves or leading their league in saves.
Among these ten pitchers, John Franco ranks 7th in ERA, ahead of three current HoF relievers; 5th in ERA+, ahead of 4 current HoF relievers; 1st in games pitched; 4th in games finished and saves both, ahead of all current HoF relievers; 8th in inherited-runners-scored percentage, ahead of two HoF relievers; 8th in innings pitched per game in relief, ahead of Trevor Hoffman and Billy Wagner; 3rd in average leverage index, ahead of 4 current HoF relievers; and 6th in save conversion percentage, ahead of 4 current HoF relievers. He had 11 seasons of over 20 saves, more than all current The conclusion is inevitable: John Franco is a distinctly Hall of Fame caliber closer. No, he’s not Mariano Rivera, he’s not Trevor Hoffman. But he was second all-time in saves when he retired (oh, and fourth in adjusted pitching runs by a reliever when he retired), and continues to have the most all-time saves by a left-hander. Let me put it another way: the idea that Goose Gossage is in the Hall of Fame and John Franco is dismissed out of hand is an absurd one. Franco’s ERA was lower and his ERA+ better (2.89 and 138 against 3.01 and 126); he pitched in higher pressure situations (1.887 against 1.585 aLI); he pitched more (1119 G, 774 GF, 424 S against 1002 G, 681 GF, 310 S); and he had a much, much better save rate (81% against 73%). And Franco was better in the post-season (1.88 ERA in 14.1 IP against 2.87 ERA in 31.1 IP). Now admittedly, Goose Gossage was a Yankee...
The argument against Franco that seems to have prevailed is, I think, an aesthetic one. People in the current sabermetric revolution are fond of telling us that the topline numbers are mediocre predictors of future success at best, and that we should be looking at the peripherals. For hitters, this is mainly strikeouts, or maybe strikeouts to walks ratio; for pitchers it is basically just strikeouts, walks, and home runs per inning. The theory is that pitchers will tend toward their peripherals-predicted performances in the future. It is also felt that the job of a good relief pitcher is to keep runners off base: those like Francisco Rodriguez who are always getting themselves in and out of jams will eventually stop being able to get out.
And, let’s be honest, John Franco’s peripherals sucked, and he let a whole lot of runners get on base. Among these ten pitchers, he ranked last in WHIP, BAA, OBA, H/9, BB/9, and SO/BB, as well as ninth in SLA and eighth in SO/9. (He was tied-for-second in HR/9, though). Franco’s WHIP number, 1.333, was way worse than most of these Hall of Fame closers, especially Rivera and Wagner at 1.003 and 0.998, respectively (yeah, Wagner’s ahead of Rivera).
But this shouldn’t matter. The point of peripherals and being wary of tightrope-walking closers is that they are predictive. Those with bad peripherals or who pitch K-Rod style will tend to see their good results vanish in the future, the sabermetricians tell us. But predictions shouldn’t enter into it when we’re talking about the Hall of Fame. After all, I don’t think the sabermetricians argue that nobody can pitch well over the long haul doing it the “bad” way, they just argue that you can’t really tell who they are and that in general people will tend toward their peripherals. But perhaps the fact that John Franco, with these dreadful peripherals and continually letting people get on base, pitched to results seriously commensurate with the other, more conventional Hall of Fame closers suggests that he was one of those guys who could consistently get out of his own jams, and who did know how to make batters hit the ball weakly or at the defenders.
The point is, we shouldn’t look at how when considering a player’s career, we should look at what. John Franco’s how is lousy: he gave up lots of hits and walks, and wasn’t an overpowering strikeout pitcher. Moreover, he doesn’t fit the mold of a closer: he didn’t throw hard, but rather got people out with his deceptive change-up (people like Barry Bonds in Game 2 of the 2000 NLDS, with a one-run lead, two outs in the ninth and a runner on, lefty-on-lefty with a changeup; yeah, that’s right). He was short, quirky, and, oh yeah, he wasn’t a Yankee. He was a Met, and we all know that Mets don’t get to be Hall of Famers.
But his what is world-class. I showed that above. And if we start prizing the how over the what in evaluating a player’s entire career, in retrospect, then the Hall of Fame is just a picture-painting contest. It’s purely aesthetic, it’s purely the decision of certain sportswriters that strikeouts and 100-mph fastballs are sexy. It is prejudice, saying that getting it done is not good enough, you need to get it done the right way. There is no right way: there is only getting it done. John Franco got it done, better than Goose Gossage, Hoyt Wilhelm, Rollie Fingers, Dennis Eckersly, or Bruce Sutter, the five closers in the Hall of Fame now. And when you come right down to it, isn’t that supposed to be all that matters?
This analysis is amazing. Sadly, it seems that no one has payed any attention to the fact that John Franco simply got the job done, even if he wasn't flashy while doing it.
ReplyDeleteThe HoF is ultimately a shrine to those who have produced results throughout their baseball careers. That train of thought holds true for runners, fielders, batters, and starting pitchers. For some reason, however, and maybe it's because the usage of the "relief pitcher" is still somewhat new in baseball, that same moniker doesn't hold true.
I hope years from now, as countless closers burn out, get injured, or simply cannot maintain their performance for a long period of time, people will realize how difficult of a task the position is, people will realize what John Franco did was extraordinary (because it was), and he will be elected into the hall through a different channel (i.e. the Veteran's committee).
In the meantime, I sincerely hope that the Mets put John into their hall of fame as he is well deserving of that honor, just as much as Tom Seaver and presumably, Mike Piazza.